



**Marine casualty  
Safety Investigation**

**Law 4033/2011 as amended and  
applies**

(summary extract of art. 1.b, 4.1.a  
& 4.1.b)

The conduct of Safety Investigations into marine casualties or incidents is independent from criminal, discipline, administrative or civil proceedings whose purpose is to apportion blame or determine liability. The sole objective of the conduct of a safety investigation is to ascertain the circumstances that caused the marine accident or incident through analysis, to draw useful conclusions and lessons learned that may lead, if necessary, to safety recommendations or proposals addressed to parties or stakeholders involved in order to take remedial actions, aiming to prevent or avoid future marine accidents.

**Points of Interest**

- This Interim Report has been published by virtue of art. 16.2 Law 4033/2011, as applies (art. 14.2 Directive 2009/18/EC) as the full investigation report will not be published within 12 months of the marine accident date.
- The Interim Report has been published for the sole purposes of the safety investigation process with no litigation in mind and should be inadmissible to any judicial or other proceedings (administrative, disciplinary, criminal or civil) whose purpose is to attribute or apportion blame or liability.
- The Interim Report only aims to present a concise summary of the events occurred on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of September 2016 that led to a serious marine accident.
- The Interim Report does not constitute legal advice in any way and should not be construed as such.

**Serious marine casualty**

**September 2017**

HBMCI conducts the safety investigation of issued marine casualty as the Lead Investigating State. The content of this Interim Report is based on current available information and data collected and analyzed during the safety investigation process into captioned marine casualty. The completion of the procedure as defined in relevant legislation may reveal or identify new information, data or evidence and consequently cause changes or amendments in data provided by this Interim Report. All times quoted are local times unless otherwise stated.

**Marine accident synopsis**

M/V SAFFET BEY under Turkish Flag is a RO-RO cargo vessel engaged on international trade. On the 1<sup>st</sup> of September 2016 at approximately 22:40, she had sailed from Trieste/Italy loaded with 119 semi-trailers heading to Cesme / Turkey, with 22 crew members plus 4 passengers (2 truck drivers and two members of the Master's family). The vessel was operating under the same circle route between ports of Cesme and Trieste. Consequently her voyage plan projected on her navigational charts included the same repetitive passages that are usually followed by vessels trading between ports of the Adriatic Sea, Ionian and Aegean Sea. According to her voyage plan she would gradually reach and pass through Ak. Tainaro located in the South West coast of Peloponnesian peninsula, and would progressively head North East through South Aegean Sea passing South of Nissos Serifos and Nissos Mykonos before finally reaching Cesme.

On the 3<sup>rd</sup> of September at approximately 19:45 the Master arrived on the bridge to take over the navigational watch (20:00-24:00). The watch handover was carried out without any particular navigational remarks, steering was in Autopilot with heading 119<sup>o</sup>, speed was about 15,6 knots and a look out was posted on the bridge. At that time the vessel was crossing Kithira Sea heading to her next way point located south of Ak Tainairo, where according to the vessel's passage plan an alteration of course should take place. At approximately 21:40 SAFFET BEY reached her next way point where the course was altered to 84<sup>o</sup> so as to follow a safe passage of the strait, between Nissos Elafonisos and Nissos Kithira.

At that time the Master acquired two vessel targets on the ship's ARPA radar coming from the opposite direction, one of them being not under command, so he decided to alter the vessel's course to 88<sup>o</sup>, in order to keep a safe distance from them. After clearing the targets at approximately 22:40, the Master set the Autopilot to 80<sup>o</sup>, in order the vessel to head back to the planned course (84<sup>o</sup>). At approximately 23:00 the Master checked vessel's position which was found to be right on the planned route. After that time the Master has not monitored the vessel's passage and consequently did not alter the vessel's course to 98<sup>o</sup> when SAFFET BEY reached her next way point (WP 48, pos. 36°24, 4N 022°56,9E) at approximately 23:05. According to AIS and VDR information the selected course, of 80<sup>o</sup>, once set to the autopilot, was maintained during Master's navigational watch until the vessel's grounding. During that time the Master was distracted with a conversation he had with his wife and daughter who were at the navigation bridge. However this information could not be verified, as the VDR data set did not include audio for the bridge area. The Bridge Navigational Alarm System (BNWAS) had been deactivated by the Master during his watch, and the posted look-out had been relieved from his duties before 23:00, due to stomach disorders without a substitute to be called.

At approximately 23: 37 SAFFET BEY grounded on the rock coastline at the sea area near Profitis Ilias, Neapolis, Greece. At the time of the casualty the weather conditions were reported to be good (wind force ENE 4-5 bfrs, sea state moderate with very good visibility). The marine accident was not reported to the Greek Authorities by the Master and the Coast Guard Authority was notified around 23:45 by a citizen who woke up from the strong noise caused by the vessel which grounded a few meters from his house. Due to the heavy impact on the rocky coastline, several compartments of her bow section were damaged at several places longitudinally. More specifically the damages were reported to be hull plating being distorted/buckled and perforated at fore peak tank, collision bulkhead, Dry tank No.1 and No.1 starboard and port bottom ballast tanks. Measures were taken by the Coast Guard Authority and the vessel's company for preventing marine pollution. No injuries and no pollution was reported. Following the casualty an underwater and internal hull inspection was carried out. On the 7<sup>th</sup> of September 2016, SAFFET BEY was refloated with the assistance of tug boats following temporary repairs according to the salvage plan prepared by salvors and anchored at Vatika bay, south of Neapolis.

On the 9<sup>th</sup> of September 2016 SAFFET BEY was detained after a Port State Control (PSC) inspection was carried out which recorded 26 deficiencies. Finally on the 17<sup>th</sup> of September 2016 after a re-inspection by the relevant Port State Control Authority and with the consent of the vessel's Flag and Class, SAFFET BEY sailed under favorable weather conditions, from Neapolis anchorage to Cesme for unloading and subsequently to Tuzla for permanent repairs, escorted by a tugboat.

**Investigation**

The undergoing safety Investigation and analysis has highlighted contributing and underlined factors as presented in random order:

- Loss of situational awareness;
- Poor bridge performance;
- The Bridge Navigational Alarm (BNWAS) was switched off;
- Absence of a posted look out during night watch
- Insufficient use of the Navigation equipment

and others as will be included in the Final Report.

**Final safety Investigation Report**

A draft safety Investigation report is under preparation and is expected to be finalized and circulated to involved and interested parties for consultation.



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## FACTUAL INFORMATION

### SHIPS PARTICULARS

Name	SAFFET BEY
Flag	TURKEY
Registry	INSTANBUL
Ship's type	RO-RO CARGO
IMO	8417118
Call sign	TCUZ
LOA (M)	163,80
Breath (M)	23,50
Year of built	1987
Shipyard	DANYARD FREDERIKSHVAN/DENMARK
Construction	STEEL
Gross Tonnage	19689
Net Tonnage	9257
Engine / Power	1 MAK TYPE 6M 601/9000BHP/6615KW
Classification Society	LLOYDS REGISTER
Minimum Safe Manning	17

### Voyage Particulars

Date of departure	01-09-2016
Trading Area	TRIESTE-CESME
Cargo on board	TRUCKS / SEMI TRAILERS
Crew on board	22 PLUS 4 PASSENGERS

### Marine Casualty Information

Date & time	03-09-2016 at 23:37 LT
Type of marine casualty	SERIOUS MARINE CASUALTY
Weather & environmental conditions	ENE 4-5 Bfrs EAST of 23.00 NE 5-6 Bfrs then quickly NE 6-7Bfrs
Location of casualty	LAT.36° 26' 08"N -LONG. 23° 06' 40' E
Indicative damages to ship	EXTENDED STRUCTURAL DAMAGES AT FORE SECTION
Fatalities / injuries	None
Marine pollution	No

